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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion between October 9, 2008 and March 
13, 2009. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then 
by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
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Involuntary Bankruptcy – Subject Matter Jurisdiction: 
Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC v. The Morrison Agency, 
Inc., 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008)  
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Principles of Comity and 
Federalism Barring Claims: Commerce Energy, Inc. v. 
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Carmack Amendment – Required Bill of Ladings: Regal-
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Involuntary Bankruptcy – Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Trusted 
Net Media Holdings, LLC v. The Morrison Agency, Inc., 550 F.3d 
1035 (11th Cir. 2008) 
In this case, the 11th Circuit considered “whether the requirements 
in 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition are elements of subject matter jurisdiction,” or whether “the 
requirements simply constitute elements that must be established to 
sustain an involuntary proceeding.” Id. at 1037, 1041. The 9th Circuit 
and a majority of lower courts have concluded that section 303(b)’s 
requirements are not subject matter jurisdiction because they can be 
waived. Id. at 1041. The 11th Circuit came to the same conclusion, but 
rather based on the fact that Congress did “not evince a congressional 
intent to implicate the bankruptcy courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. 
at 1043. As the 11th Circuit explained, Congress had conferred general 
jurisdiction upon bankruptcy courts in Title 11 cases. Id. at 1044. In 
reaching this conclusion, the 11th Circuit rejected the 2nd Circuit’s 
minority position that parties must satisfy the threshold involuntary 
bankruptcy requirements before bankruptcy courts can gain subject 
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1041–42. 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Principles of Comity and 
Federalism Barring Claims: Commerce Energy, Inc. v. Levin, 554 
F.3d 1094 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether principles of comity and 
federalism bar an otherwise valid 28 U.S.C. § 1341, or Tax Injunction 
Act claim. Id. at 1098. The court adopted the interpretation of the 7th and 
9th Circuits, and determined that principles of comity and federalism 
only bar state taxation challenges where successful litigation would 
“operate to reduce the flow of state tax revenue,” rejecting the 4th 
Circuit’s expansive interpretation. Id. at 1097–99. The court determined 
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that an expansive reading was inappropriate because it “would render an 
Act of Congress entirely superfluous.” Id. at 1102. Furthermore, the 
court stated that the 4th Circuit’s expansive reading would sub silentio 
overrule prior Supreme Court and lower court rulings. Id. Therefore, in 
adopting a narrow holding and allowing subject matter jurisdiction to be 
exercised, the court reasoned that the current claim “would not 
significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio.” 
Id. 
 
District Court Discretion – Federal Magistrate Act: Williams v. 
McNeil, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2484 (11th Cir. Feb.  10, 2009) 
The 11th Circuit addressed “[w]hether a district court has discretion 
not to consider a petitioner’s arguments regarding the timeliness of his 
federal habeas petition when the petitioner raises the timeliness 
arguments for the first time in his objections to a magistrate judge’s 
report and recommendation.” Id. at *1. The court first noted that under 
the Federal Magistrates Act, a magistrate judge lacks authority to make a 
final and binding ruling on a dispositive motion. Id. at *8. Further, a 
district court retains total control “of the entire process if it refers 
dispositive motions to a magistrate judge for recommendation.” Id. at *9. 
The court cited the 4th Circuit’s holding that “a district court must 
consider all arguments, regardless of whether they were raised before the 
magistrate judge,” as compared to opposite holdings in the 1st, 5th, 9th 
and 10th Circuits. Id. at *10. The court agreed with the latter circuit 
courts that eliminating district court discretion to consider arguments not 
raised before the magistrate would nullify the very purpose of the 
Federal Magistrates Act, which was to help relieve a district court’s 
workload. Id. at *10–12. The 11th Circuit concluded “that the district 
court has such discretion and, under the circumstances of this case, did 
not abuse its discretion.” Id. at *1. 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  
 
Carmack Amendment – Required Bill of Ladings: Regal-Beloit 
Corp. v. Kawaski Kisen Kaisha, LTD, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3597 
(9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2009) 
The 9th Circuit considered whether “the absence of a separate bill 
of lading” for the domestic, overland leg of an overseas shipment 
prevents the application of the Carmack Amendment’s default forum-
selection provisions. Id. at *24–27. The court recognized that prior 
precedent in the 9th Circuit held that the Carmack Amendment does 
apply to overseas shipments “without any requirement for a separate 
domestic bill of lading for the inland carriage.” Id. at *26. Despite 
contrary authority in the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 11th Circuits, the court 
dismissed the contention that its prior assertion was dictum. Id. 
Therefore, in reaffirming its stance, the 9th Circuit stated that “the 
absence of a separate bill of lading does not remove this shipment from 
Carmack’s venue restrictions.” Id. at *27. 
 
RLUIPA – Sovereign Immunity: Sossamon v. The Lone Star State 
of Texas, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3701 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2009) 
The 5th Circuit considered whether Texas’s sovereign immunity 
barred official capacity causes of action if they were permitted under the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. Id. at *28. Recognizing that the RLUIPA 
was passed under Congress’s Spending Clause power, the court 
determined that “when deciding the validity of a putative waiver of 
sovereign immunity through a state’s participation in a Spending Clause 
contract, [the court considers] whether Congress spoke with sufficient 
clarity to put the state on notice that, to accept federal funds, the state 
must also accept liability for monetary damages.” Id. at *29–30. While 
the court acknowledged the divergent opinion of the 11th Circuit on this 
issue, it sided with the 4th Circuit’s emphasis that “appropriate relief” 
was an ambiguous RLUIPA term that did not favor a waiver of immunity 
under the Supreme Court’s waiver doctrine. Id. at *30–32. The 5th 
Circuit thus held that “whether or not RLUIPA creates a cause of action 
for damages against Texas and the defendants in their official capacities, 
any award of damages is barred by Texas’s sovereign immunity.” Id. at 
*33. 
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ERISA – Statute of Limitations: Browning v. Tiger’s Eye Benefits 
Consulting, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3927 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2009) 
In this case, the 4th Circuit deviated from the majority of other 
circuits and held that “actual knowledge” under the ERISA statute of 
limitations framework of 29 U.S.C. § 1113 should be determined by a 
“fact intensive” inquiry. Id. at *13. The court noted that the 3rd and 5th 
Circuits have adopted a narrow interpretation that “actual knowledge” 
under the ERISA statute requires a showing that plaintiffs actually knew 
of both the events that occurred which constitute a breach or violation 
and also that those events supported a claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
or violation under ERISA. Id. at *10. The 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits 
only require knowledge of the facts or transaction that constituted the 
alleged violation. Id. at *10–11. The 4th Circuit, by contrast, did not 
settle on a hard and fast definition of “actual knowledge.” Id. at *12. The 
court instead reasoned that because the “point in which one has actual 
knowledge of the breach of violation” depends on such things as the 
“complexity of the legal claim and the egregiousness of the alleged 
violation,” as well as whether the “plaintiff knows the essential facts of 
the transaction or conduct constituting a violation,” a “fact intensive” 
inquiry is required. Id. at *12–13. 
 
Federal Magistrates Act – Judicial Discretion: Williams v. 
McNeil, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2484 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009) 
The 11th Circuit considered “[w]hether a district court has 
discretion not to consider a petitioner’s arguments” when raised “for the 
first time in his objections to a magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation.” Id. at *1. The court first noted that under the Federal 
Magistrates Act, a magistrate judge lacks authority to make a final and 
binding ruling on a dispositive motion. Id. at *8. A district court retains 
total control “of the entire process if it refers dispositive motions to a 
magistrate judge for recommendation.” Id. at *9. The court cited the 4th 
Circuit’s holding that “a district court must consider all arguments, 
regardless of whether they were raised before the magistrate judge,” as 
compared to opposite holdings in the 1st, 5th, 9th and 10th Circuits. Id. 
at *10. The latter circuit courts found that not permitting district courts to 
have discretion would nullify the very purpose of the Federal Magistrates 
Act, which was to help relieve a district court’s workload. Id. at *10–12. 
Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded “that the district court has such 
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discretion and, under the circumstances of this case, did not abuse its 




Sentencing Guidelines – Imposition of Consecutive Sentences: 
United States v. Lowe, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4184 (8th Cir. Mar. 
3, 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether a district court “lacks authority 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) to impose a sentence to run consecutive to a 
yet to be imposed state sentence.” Id. at *2. The court held that it would 
remain consistent with its precedent that “the authority to impose such a 
federal sentence . . . falls within the broad discretion granted to the 
court.” Id. The 8th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd Circuit’s belief that the 
legislative history of § 3584(a) allows consecutive sentence “only where 
multiple terms imposed at the same time or where the defendant is 
already subject to an undischarged term.” Id. at *3. Instead, the 8th 
Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit that “§ 3584(a) does not prohibit a 
district court from imposing a consecutive sentence in these 
circumstances.” Id. The court also agreed with the 11th Circuit that the 
federal court does not lack “authority to impose a federal sentence to run 
consecutive to a yet to be imposed state sentence because it would hinder 
state sentencing discretion.” Id. Finally, the 8th Circuit agreed with the 
5th Circuit’s reasoning that the district court “may consider subsequent 
sentences anticipated, but not yet imposed, in separate state court 
proceedings when exercising discretion to impose [a] consecutive 
sentence.” Id. at *2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Drug Statutes – Definition: United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 
381 (6th Cir. 2009) 
In this case, the 6th Circuit determined that the definition of 
“cocaine base” in 21 U.S.C. § 841 means only “crack cocaine.” Id. at 
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395. After noting that the majority of circuits, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 5th, and 10th, have refused to limit the definition of “cocaine base” 
and have instead held that it includes all forms of “cocaine base,” the 
court decided to follow the 7th, 9th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits which have 
limited § 841’s definition to “crack cocaine.” Id. at 394–95. In coming to 
its conclusion, the court determined that Congress intended that the 
enhanced sentencing penalties for “cocaine base” would apply to crimes 
involving “crack cocaine.” Id. at 395. Furthermore, the court reasoned 
that such an interpretation of “cocaine base” would be in line with the 
Sentencing Guidelines which define “cocaine base” as “crack cocaine.” 
Id. 
 
